Remember that Trump-brokered peace deal between Armenia and Azerbaijan? It promised big things for the South Caucasus, including new transport routes and border agreements. But was it truly the breakthrough everyone hoped for, or are there still crucial pieces missing from this complex puzzle? Dive into the details and decide for yourself!
The highly anticipated peace summit hosted by then-U.S. President Donald Trump in Washington brought together the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan, initially hailed as a significant breakthrough in the long-standing South Caucasus conflict. While the ceremonial event featured separate bilateral discussions before a joint declaration, the actual outcomes presented a nuanced reality, offering both unexpected progress and lingering uncertainties regarding the region’s complex geopolitical landscape.
Key practical results emerged from the summit, including the initialing of a bilateral peace treaty by the foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan. Additionally, all three presidents signed a preliminary document outlining the establishment of a “connectivity project,” signaling a concrete step towards fostering regional cooperation and economic integration in an area historically plagued by conflict and isolation.
For Armenia, a nation strategically recognizing its own vulnerabilities, the peace treaty brought significant diplomatic achievements. Crucially, Azerbaijan officially recognized Armenia’s current borders, effectively abandoning previous irredentist claims on Armenian territory, which had fueled tensions. This recognition is poised to provide a foundation for ongoing border delineation and demarcation talks, which have stagnated for years, offering a pathway to greater stability.
The “connectivity project,” ambitiously named the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP), offers a vital incentive for postwar peace. This initiative, focusing on new road and rail projects, is particularly significant for Armenia. It provides a much-needed opening to overcome its economic constraints, stemming from decades of border closures with Turkey and Azerbaijan, fostering greater trade and reducing its historical overdependence on Russia.
Conversely, the TRIPP agreement grants Azerbaijan a long-sought direct connection to its exclave of Nakhchivan. This route is strategically important for Baku, not only to reduce its reliance on Iranian territory and airspace for access but also to advance its broader aspiration of serving as a pivotal gateway to Central Asia, enhancing its regional economic and political influence.
Notably, the agreement also stipulated involvement from “third parties,” specifically U.S. private interests, in the TRIPP project. This emphasis on U.S. corporate investment aligns with the Trump administration’s business-oriented approach to brokering peace and reflects a personal interest in securing a “deal” for the nations. Such American engagement further serves to sideline the influence of both Russia and Iran, challenging long-standing regional dynamics.
Despite these critical shifts, Moscow has reacted with unusual passivity, seemingly perceiving opportunity rather than threat in the TRIPP project, hoping to leverage its own role in managing regional transport to restore influence. Similarly, the agreements offer Turkey a long-awaited political rationale to normalize relations with Armenia without unduly antagonizing Azerbaijan, potentially allowing Ankara to reassert its regional role in the South Caucasus.
However, the long-term success of these agreements ultimately hinges on sustained international engagement, a factor that raises serious questions. The South Caucasus has historically not been a primary U.S. national interest, often viewed through the lens of broader U.S.-Russian relations or policies toward Turkey and Iran. The absence of a robust international guarantee or guarantor for the treaty’s implementation leaves a significant void, fostering uncertainty about the durability of this hopeful but incomplete peace.
